ARM: Research for information freedom (Horizon EUROPE)
The ARM project delves into authoritarian strategies for information control beyond borders. While foreign disinformation receives ample scrutiny, other forms of foreign information manipulation and intervention (FIMI) remain overlooked. Analyzing Russia, China, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, ARM conceptualises and addresses different forms of FIMI. The project will explore the extent that major global players like China and Russia, alongside Ethiopia and Rwanda, engage in transnational information suppression, particularly targeting European diaspora communities. ARM is funded by EU’s Horizon Europe programme for research and innovation. Role: WP leader of WP3 Russia
Policy brief: ‘Information suppression’ (July 2024)
The Global Politics of Internet Freedom
In this collaborative project with Tetyana Lokot (Dublin City University), we analyse how various groups of actors – the tech and academic communities, civil society, states and international organisations, and the private sector – have influenced how we conceptualise internet freedom and the real-world consequences of their ideas.
Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAIS) Working group 2024
Lokot, T., & Wijermars, M. (2023). The politics of internet freedom rankings. Internet Policy Review, 12(2).
Reigniting Multilateralism through Technology (REMIT)
In a world rapidly shaped by technological advancements, there is an urgent need to harness the power of technological innovation while at the same time uphold the principles of multilateralism and global governance. REMIT is an ambitious research initiative funded by the EU’s Horizon Europe programme for research and innovation. We aim to transform EU’s role in global governance and cooperation in the digital age.
Kan Rusland een ‘digitaal ijzeren gordijn’ bouwen? Podcast De Atlantische Blik, 17 July 2024.
Wijermars, M. (2024). How ‘sovereign’ is Russia’s internet? What Russia’s confrontations with US platforms tell us about the limits to digital sovereignty. Atlantisch Perspectief, 48(1), 15–17.
The Platformisation of Authoritarian Control in Russia
Authoritarian states, such as China, have used digital technologies to strengthen their regimes, for example through surveillance systems, online propaganda and censorship. There has been a surge in research demonstrating the variety of strategies autocracies use to increase their control over the digital sphere, and formulating reasons why autocrats choose to (not) restrict digital freedoms. Yet, scholarship on digital authoritarianism has largely overlooked one key element: the concentration of power in increasingly integrated digital infrastructures and the transnational dependencies this has given rise to. I argue that this vertical and horizontal integration of digital services and infrastructures has introduced novel challenges and constraints; especially for states who, unlike China, are not digitally autonomous. For example, why do some authoritarian and illiberal states succeed in pressuring foreign social media to censor online content, while others do not? The project, initiated as part of my HCAS fellowship, aims to reconceptualise how we understand the relationship between authoritarian regimes and digital technologies, building upon selected case studies from Russia.
Towards sustainable journalism for the algorithmic future
This project, funded by Helsingin Sanomat Foundation (2020-2022), examined the adoption of digital technologies in Russian news media and the role of Russian ‘big tech’ (Yandex) in shaping the Russian information space. Building upon over fifty interviews and complementary methods, the project demonstrated, e.g., how questions of data access, data reliability, societal impact and repercussions condition how data journalism is practiced under authoritarian conditions. It also uncovered how journalistic practices in Russia are changing in a way that negatively impacts press freedom as media negotiate their visibility on online platforms (e.g., news aggregators).
Dovbysh, O., Wijermars, M., & Makhortykh, M. (2022). How to reach Nirvana: Yandex, news personalisation, and the future of Russian journalistic media. Digital Journalism.
Selling censorship: Affective framing and the legitimation of internet control in Russia (NWO Rubicon)
In today’s hyperconnected world, states are confronted with the global challenge of responding to potentially disruptive online communications, such as terrorist propaganda and fake news. In Russia, these threats have been instrumentalized to legitimate a dramatic decline in internet freedom. Scholars have investigated the curtailment of internet freedom in contemporary Russia, drawing attention to its infrastructural, economic, regulatory and foreign policy aspects. But how does the Russian government legitimate and cultivate popular support for these policies? This research project studied how the internet and its regulation are framed in political and media discourses. It asked what role the mobilisation of affect plays in legitimating censorship and surveillance. Employing a mixed methods, case-study approach, it analysed how affective frames are produced by policymakers, how they are translated and disseminated in state and (semi-) independent media, and how they resonate in social media and online debates.
Wijermars, M. (2022). Selling internet control: the framing of the Russian ban of messaging app Telegram. Information, Communication & Society, 25(15), 2190-2206.
Wijermars, M. (2021). Russia’s law ‘On news aggregators’: Control the news feed, control the news? Journalism, 22(12), 2938–2954.
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